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SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF THE
GLASNOST ERA. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
RE7T R LUDWIKOWSKr
I. INTRODUCTION
Glasnost is defined by Russian-English dictionaries as publicity or
openness.' Glasnyi means "open" or "public." 2 Both the Western and the
Soviet press characterize glasnost as a policy of change that replaced a
policy of stagnation typical of the Brezhnev era.3 The student of socialist
law and politics who wants to find out what really changed in socialist
domestic and foreign policy will, however, experience some difficulty.
If we were to assess glasnost from the thousands of inscriptions,
leaflets and statements 4 we would have to acknowledge that its most
striking characteristic is a more open criticism of communism. In an
* Dr. Rett Ludwikowski is a Professor of Law at The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law, and the Director of the Comparative and International Law
Institute. He was formerly a Professor of Law and Politics at Jagiellonian University in
Cracow, Poland where he held the Chair of the Modem, Legal, Political Movement and
Ideas, and served as the Chair of the the Division of Law and Business.
1. AKHMANOVA'S RUSSIAN-ENGUSH DICIONARY 124 (1981).
2. Id.
3. Remnick, Even Lenin Now Comes Under Criticism, Wash. Post, June 7, 1988, at A17,
col. 1.
4. For example, "Socialism," argues Professor Leslaw Paga from the Catholic University
of Lublin, Poland, "is a transitory period from capitalism to ... capitalism." Lecture by
Professor Leslaw Paga, Catholic Univ. of Lublin, Poland, at Catholic Univ. of America,
Department of Economics (Apr. 15, 1988); see also Remnick, supra note 3. Passing along
streets of Polish cities one can easily notice large inscriptions on the walls of houses:
"Proletarians of all countries, forgive me--Karl Marx." See The Crisis of Communism " Its
Meaning Origins, and Phases, Inst. for Foreign Pol'y Analysis, Inc., Foreign Pol'y Rep., at
vii (1986) [hereinafter The Crisis of Communism]. One Communist newspaper contains
the cartoon strip showing a young boy talking to his grandmother. The boy is asking,
"Grandma, please tell us again how long it was when long, long ago there was no equality
but there was something to eat on the table?" Przeglad 7yodniowy, March 1988.
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article entitled "Sources," published in Novy Mir, even Lenin comes under
criticism for abolishing private property and creating a system of forced
labor camps.5 An article in Pravda, mostly a compilation of letters from
readers, leveled serious charges against former Kremlin officials like
Suslov and Brezhnev.6
The real change, therefore, exists in the possibility of discussing
problems that were for decades prohibited topics in the socialist countries.
This change is often reduced to a criticism of key elements of socialist
economy and social life, with current politics still being an almost taboo
topic. The Western observer impressed by this change often confuses this
"criticism from within" with "reform from within" and forgets to check to
what extent the criticized core of the totalitarian system has really
changed. The observer forgets that the mere possibility of exposing the
distresses of the system from within does not change the system ipsofacto.
Glasnost has, however, new international implications that must be
carefully analyzed in the West.
II. THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DISTRESSES
OF PERESTROIKA
Even the most enthusiastic commentators of Gorbachev's attempts to
restructure the Soviet economy admit that the system does not show many
symptoms of a quick economic recovery.7 Gorbachev's glasnost and
perestroika are tested in an atmosphere that resembles the Sisyphean
Labors rather than the noisy hurrah-enthusiasm of the Khrushchev era.
The success of the reforms is a function of a variable that is the sum
total of many elements -social, ideological, economic, and political.
Examination of these elements yields conclusions that are not optimistic
for the prospects of the socialist economy. For example, it must be
admitted that the system has forever destroyed the so-called collective
mentality that was supposed to be a basic component of Communist
political culture. Moreover, the crisis of Communist ideology is irrever-
sible. The belief of the masses in Marxism-Leninism cannot be
reconstructed, yet not even Gorbachev seems to be ready to relinquish
obsolete dogmas because he hardly knows how to function without them.
The ideological crisis has also undermined the rudiments of Communist
morality and corroded all Marxist-Leninist values, including the key dogma
of common ownership, and it has killed healthy incentives among workers
5. See Remnick, supra note 3.
6. Lee, Article in Pravda Assesses Difficulties for Gorbachev, Wash. Post, June 8, 1988,
at Al, col. 1.
7. Remnick, Soviet Officials Detail Budge4 Paint Grim Economic Picture, Wash. Post,
Oct. 28, 1988, at A1, col. 3.
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and managers. The double standard of morality, together with massive
economic dislocations, has created a black market and corruption, which
have been tolerated for so long that they are now irrevocably integrated
in the way of life of Communist countries.8
The need for creating a relatively open Party elite forced the Party
to build a system of "negative selection" that promotes compliant,
conformable, "yes" men, who care far more about their careers than
about the system of Communist values.9 Lack of competence, widespread
corruption, and unaccountability of decision-makers are factors that are
incompatible with the basic principles of economic efficiency. 10 Lack of
information, coordination, "and proper control over the implementation
of [productive] decisions, coupled with a form of decentralization that is
more apparent than real, [cripple] the socialist system of central planning
and decision-making."" These factors also work against the attempts to
introduce market mechanisms into the socialist system. The combination
of central planning and market economy, and the totalitarian power of the
Party and the socialist democracy, may be characterized as a person who
is "half pregnant, half not." This kind of reform may result in the
creation (using Kolakowski's expression) of a sort of "boiling ice.'"'2
Furthermore, it is now quite obvious even for the Soviet leadership
that without the rudiments of democracy, people can be forced to work,
but not to work efficiently. On the other hand, democratic transforma-
tions are dangerous for the ruling elite. They are simply incompatible
with the totalitarian framework of the system. Glasnost already opened
the Pandora's box of social distress and resulted in a serious social
turbulence. Gorbachev's silent admission that Eastern Europe was an
economic burden the Soviet Union could no longer afford, gave a spur to
8. The trial of Yuri Churbanov, Soviet Deputy Interior Minister and Brezhnev's
son-in-law, before a military tribunal confirms only the existence of a vast Mafia-like
network of corrupt Communist Party officials in all levels of the Soviet power structure.
See Churbanov i inni (Churbanov and Others), Polityka, Oct. 1, 1988, at 1, and Jabc socjalizm
zbudujemy? (What Kind of Socialism Will We Build?), id., at 2.; Dobbs, Brezhnev Kin Admits
Abusing His Powers, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 5. On the reports on the
corruption of East Germany's Party officials, see Diehl, E. Germany's Krenz Quits as Head
of State, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
9. See N. EBERSTADT, THE POVERTY OF COMMUNISM (1988).
10. Soviet Finance Minister, Boris Gostev, reported in October 1988 on vast budget
deficits (36 billion rubles, the equivalent of $59 billion at the official exchange rate) which
would amount to 7.3% of the total budget next year. Also, he reported that 24,000 state
enterprises are economically inefficient. The grim picture of socialist economy was
confirmed by the Polish decision to close Gdansk shipyard as a deficit plant. Remnick,
Gorbachev Named New Soviet President, Wash. Post, Oct. 2,1988, at Al, col. 5; see also N.
EBERSTADT, supra note 9.
11. See The Crisis of Communism, supra note 4, at x.
12. Id. at xi.
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a sweeping tide of reforms that transformed the Communist leadership in
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria. The
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe resulted in a pluralization of
the political life and dropping the constitutional clauses which guaranteed
the vanguard status of the Communist parties. An irresistible process of
a replacement of the East European communist leaders by non-communist
governments had already triggered new ethnic protests in the Soviet
Union. 3
The system created its own vicious circle because without the Party
bureaucracy and nomenclature people, the Party cannot function; but
with them, no reform is possible.14 Both are key ingredients of a system
which can be crushed but not reformed; they are an inseparable part of
the system.A5
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES: DECEPTION OR TRUE REFORM?
It seems that the socialist leaders have begun to notice that the
restructuring of the system is a dramatic task. They have found out that
successfulperestroika requires time, funds, patience and social support, and
that the Soviet leadership has run short of these goods. In the past, their
predecessors attempted to conceal symptoms of internal crises. To stifle
criticism and subordinate Communist countries' societies to the dictator-
ship of the Party, the leaders used several techniques which have been
interchangeably employed: the strategy of terror used most effectively by
Stalin, the appealing promise of Communist economic success used by
Stalin's successors and the ideological or nationalist euphoria which was
exploited during the post-revolutionary time and during the period of war.
None of these strategies may be used as successfully as before. Ideologi-
cal or nationalist cliches do not appeal to people who want to live on the
level of civilized societies. Terror is still effective, but its blatant
application does not fit the liberal disguise of Gorbachev's leadership
during the glasnost period, and glasnost is a prerequisite to Soviet relations
with the West. For the Soviet leaders, it has become quite obvious that
without cooperation and technology from the West, the economies of the
bloc countries will deteriorate further, just at a time when Western
economies are on the mend. Continuation of detente and cooperation
seems to be viewed by the Soviet leaders as a condition sine qua non of
perestroika and glasnost as the price paid for the successful restructuring
of the socialist economy.
13. Remnick, Muli-Pany Plan Adopted by Lithuania Estonia Votes to Defy Gorbachev
Warning, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
14. See The Crisis of Commnuism, supra note 4, at 30.
15. For a more extensive examination, see id.
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It must be admitted that glasnost has changed the style of life of the
people in the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger commented after his visit
to the Soviet Union:
The seediness of the accommodations had not changed, nor the
backwardness of what in the West are considered life's amenities.
One remains amazed that a country subsiding on so marginal a
standard of living should conduct so assertive a global policy.
Yet the surface impression of stagnation is misleading. There is
clearly unprecedented ferment underneath the gloomy surface of
wintry Moscow. The new leadership is different. It displays a
vigor, dynamism and flexibility inconceivable 10 years ago.16
Even those experts on the Soviet domestic policy who believe in the
seriousness of the reform program admit, however, that liberalization is
only a by-product of perestroika and the achievements of glasnost should
be checked carefully. "The purpose of that reform is not to spur
democracy or freedom; it is to encourage efficiency and industrial
progress, hence, to make the Soviet Union more powerful." 17
Gorbachev's critics also argue that his perestroika model is outmoded,
and the Soviet Union lost its leading role in the sweeping tide of reforms,
outpaced by several East European countries.18 It is frequently claimed
that the core of the Soviet system stays almost unchanged. Gorbachev is
unwilling to permit serious debate on the nature of socialism and still
believes that Marxism-Leninism may be used as an ideological basis for
perestroika.19 He rejects claims that the events in Eastern Europe signify
the collapse of communism and defends the future mission of the Socialist
Revolution. A widespread system of police control is not as effective and
visible as before, but can be reanimated easily. The program of leasing
land to the farmers is unsatisfactory, and the concepts of reprivatization
and denationalization of the state property are still rejected, and the
conservatives successfully defend the preservation of key elements of the
centralized economy.20 Until recently, only an internal reform of the
Soviet Communist Party and a heralded shift of power from the political
to the legislative bodies, were generally received in the West as significant
symptoms of diminishing totalitarianism within the Soviet system.21
16. Kissinger, Kissinger: How to Deal with Gorbachev, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 1987, at 39.
17. Id.
18. Remnick, Gorbachev's Bold Critic, Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
19. Id. at A44, col. 4.
20. Dobbs, Conservatives Fighting Reform, Top Soviet Economist Tells Planning Panel,
Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1989, at A44, col. 1.
21. Remnick, Soviets Maintain Communist Party in the Vanguard', Wash. Post, Nov. 13,
19901
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Since May 1988, the Soviet and Western press have commented on
the sweeping proposals for radical political reform that would reduce the
Party's power and enhance the role of elected bodies. 22 Addressing the
Nineteenth Soviet Communist Party Congress in June 1988, Gorbachev
supported an idea of multi-candidate elections in March 1989, a man-
datory retirement age for Party leaders, and vast structural reforms of the
rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet.23  The radicalism of the proposal to
establish a more strict separation of powers between the Party and
legislative bodies was dimmed by the suggestion that the Party's regional
first secretaries should be chairmen of the local Soviets.2 4 It was also
quite obvious that a declaration "to curb the [Plarty's control" was
inconsistent with the personal growth of the power of Gorbachev, who
was expected to extend his Party post to the presidency of the Supreme
Soviet.2s
The Draft Law on Constitutional Amendments was published in
October 1988.26  In light of the discussion on the process of "de-
totalitarianization" of the Soviet system, the constitutional changes
warrant special consideration. Their assessment, however, requires a
careful study of the Soviet post-revolution constitutional development.
The question as to whether they are a true reform, or only a deception
conceived to divert attention from internal distresses of the system, must
be examined in a historical perspective.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY OF TsARIST RUSSIA
Responding to the attempts to link Soviet totalitarianism to the
traditions of Tsarist Russia, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote:
In their presentation of pre-revolutionary Russia, many Western
historians succumb to a persistent but fallacious tradition, thereby
to some extent echoing the arguments of Soviet propaganda.
Before the outbreak of war in 1914, Russia could boast of a
flourishing manufacturing industry, rapid growth, and a flexible,
decentralized economy; its inhabitants were not constrained in
their choice of economic activities, distinct progress was being
1989, at A21, col. 6.
22. Watson, Gorbachev's Power Play, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1988, at 48; Remnick, Soviets
Pose Changes to Party Rue, Wash. Post, June 19, 1988, at A23, col. 1.
23. Lee, Gorbachev, Delegates Seek Middle Ground, Wash. Post, June 29, 1988, at A22,
cOl. 1.
24. Id. at col. 4.
25. Watson, supra note 22, at 48.
26. Published in Pravda, Oct. 22, 1988, at 1-2.
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made in the field of workers' legislation, and the material
well-being of the peasants was at a level which has never been
reached under the Soviet regime. Newspapers were free from
preliminary political censorship (even during the war), there was
complete cultural freedom, the intelligentsia was not restricted in
its activity, religious and philosophical views of every shade were
tolerated, and institutions of higher education enjoyed inviolable
autonomy. Russia, with her many nationalities, knew no
deportations of entire peoples and no armed separatist move-
ments. This picture is not merely dissimilar to that of the
communist era, but is in every respect its direct antithesis.
27
Solzehintsyn's view is undoubtedly correct however, it must be
supplemented. Russia at the turn of century experienced rapid wester-
nization and remarkable industrial development.2 It is true that during
this period, no other state approached the rate of Russian economic
growth39 Yet, the industrial countries of the West had experienced this
period of rapid upsurge in the previous century and were able to help
speed up the transformation of the Russian economy. Western producers
and banks were vitally concerned with absorbing the Russian market.
This scenario prompted an insurgence of foreign capital which controlled
a significant part of Russian industry and the stock market-'
The process of industrialization was the result of combined factors:
the activity of the Russian bourgeoisie, Western capital, and the Tsarist
government. David Lane summed up this phenomenon in the following
way:
The activity of the state was one of the most important factors
in encouraging this economic growth. Protective tariffs supported
the new industry: foreign investors were often purchasers of
Russian industrial products. The state itself directly owned and
managed many factories, particularly in brewing and armaments
and by 1900 most of the railway system had been nationalized. 31
It must be admitted, however, that this relative progress should not
obscure the still existing backwardness of the Russian economy.
27. A. SOLZHENrLSYN, THE MORTAL DANGER: How MISCONCETIONs ABoUr RUSSLA
IMPERIL AMERICA 15-16 (M. Nicholson & A. Klimoff trans. 1980) (published as a separate
brochure).
28. D. LANE, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE U.S.S.R. 24-25 (rev. ed. 1978).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id.
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The same remains true regarding the constitutional development.
The regime that attempted to control the development of industry also
tried to remain in charge of other aspects of life. The Okhrana, the
Tsarist secret police, certainly should not be associated with the K.G.B.
or the N.K.V.D. But it is also true that its political function, activity,
and the degree of penetration in daily life was exceptionally vast.32 It
"had become notorious as an all-prevailing instrument of penetration and
repression. Government and conspirators were locked in a never-ending
battle, which became an integral part of Russian political life."33 The
centralized autocracy of the Tsars would not tolerate any formal opposi-
tion. Prior to 1906 (except the brief period of activity of the "Zemsky
Zabor"), popular dissatisfaction could not find any official representation
before the tsar.3 The successive forced steps toward a democratic
government were a failure.
The announcement of the general strike and the rise of peasants
frightened Nicholas II. On August 19, 1905, he issued regulations for
the election of a national representative body based upon a restricted
suffrage.3 5 On October 30, he signed an imperial manifesto in which he
promised: 1) to grant the inviolability of a person, freedom of con-
science, speech and assembly, and the right to form unions; 2) to permit
the participation in the Duma (representative body) of the Empire leaving
the further development of the principle of universal suffrage to the
newly established legislative procedure; 3) to establish, as an immutable
right, that no law shall become effective without the approval of the
Imperial Duma; and 4) to vest in the Duma the right to supervise the
legality of the work of the Imperial administration.3 The Fundamental
Laws of the Russian Empire of May 6, 1906, still provided, "The Emperor
of all the Russians wields the supreme autocratic power. To obey his
authority, not only through fear but for the sake of conscience, is ordered
by God himself."37 The Emperor was vested with the legislative power
32. See Struve, Russia pod nadzorom politsii, I Osobbozdeniie 357 (No. 20/21, Apr. 18
to May 1, 1903); see also Smith, The Okhrana: the Russian Depalnent of Police, 33 HOOVER
INsT. BIBuoGRAPHICAL. SEREs 20 (1967). Smith wrote, "The Okhrana seemingly melted into
oblivion after 1917; its organization absorbed into the various anticommunist armies or
forces. Its methodology was another matter, the younger communist-police organization
adopted many Okhrana techniques but went far beyond the Okhrana in numbers,
ruthlessness, and terror." For a broad analysis of the confrontation between Okhrana and
Cheka, see A. VASSILYEV, THE OKHRANA: THE RussLAN SECRET POUCE chs. XXII-XXV
(1930).
33. J. NEiITL, THE SovIET ACHIEVEMENT 20 (1967).
34. Id.
35. II MODERN CONsTrtrnoNS 181 (W. Dodd ed. 1909).
36. Id.
37. The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire, reprinted in II MODERN CONSITrU-
TiONS, supra note 35, at 182-95, art. 4.
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jointly with the Council of the Empire and the Imperial Duma. The
initiative in all legislative measures belonged to the Emperor. 3
The Duma was instituted by the Imperial order of August 19, 1905,
on the basis of indirect elections with a limited suffrage.39 The Duma
has never acquired the functions usually associated with a genuine
parliamentary legislature and was dissolved on July 21, 1906.40 The
second Duma met on March 5, 1907.41 It was dissolved on June 16, 1907,
"because of its failure immediately to surrender, upon the demand of the
government, fifty-five Social Democratic members accused of plotting
against the government." 4 The third Duma met on November 14, 1907.
43
In violation of the Fundamental Laws, the Emperor issued election laws
which made the suffrage even more unequal than before.44 The fourth
Duma was called in 1912 and survived until 1917.41 Its legislative
initiative was weak and it remained mostly an instrument of mild criticism
of the government. 46
The Revolution did not bring about rapid constitutional changes.
Even after the abdication of the Tsar and the victory of the Revolution,
the Bolsheviks remained a small and relatively unpopular minority among
other revolutionary parties.47 The subsequent overthrow of the Provisional
Government and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks did not give them
a decisive majority in the electoral bodies - the Soviets and the Con-
stituent Assembly. The Assembly, where the Bolsheviks gained only 25%
of the vote (175 of the 707 seats) was promptly dissolved.4 "After one
day, when they were unable to compel the constituent assembly to do
their bidding, armed guards under their control closed the session. Thus
ended the only genuinely elected legislative body during the whole period
38. Id. arts. 7-8.
39. II MoDERN CoNsfIrnToNs, supra note 35, at 181.
40. Id. at 192 n.4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. D. BARRY & C. BARNER-BARRY, CoNTEMPoRARY SoviET POLmCS: AN INTRODUCnON
20 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter D. BARRY].
46. Id.
47. Lenin admitted that insisting on "recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets
of Workers' Deputies our Party is a minority, so far a small minority, as against a bloc of
all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialist and the Socialist-
-Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee." 24 V. LENIN, Tasks of the Proletariat
in the Present Revolution, in COLLECID WoRKs 22 (1964); see also . NETL, supra note 33,
at 65.
48. Curtiss, The Rusian Reolution of 1917, in THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, THE SOVIET SYSmuM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (S. Hendel 5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE].
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of Soviet rule."49 Lenin used to comment that life and revolution pushed
the Constituent Assembly into the background. 0 The Soviets (The
Councils of the Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates), who were more
sensitive to revolutionary rhetoric, survived. "All power to the Soviets"
meant, however, controlled participation under the leadership of the Party
that took power by force.5
These factors accounted for Lenin's belief that the revolution could
be rescued only without democracy, and, if it was to be the Bolshevik
revolution, he was absolutely right. Masters of the art of grasping power
and of backstage manipulations, the Bolsheviks could not lead Russia
along the parliamentary path. The Party seized power, and, as many
Bolshevik leaders explicitly admitted, it could not relax its domination
without the risk that it would be swept from power altogether."2 Even if
Lenin believed that in the future it would be possible to reconvert the
dictatorship of the Party into a dictatorship of the proletariat, actual
practice proved that the Party could never renounce its position without
the risk of total defeat.3 3 The forced "education" of the masses appeared
to be completely unsuccessful. In this sense, reality undoubtedly solidified
Lenin's theoretical totalitarian construction.
V. THE SOVIET REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTION OF 1918
Characterizing constitution-making process, Christopher Osakwe
wrote:
The making of a Soviet Constitution has all the trappings of a
theatrical show. The preparation leading to the staging of the
show is elaborate, exhaustive, and behind the scene. At the point
during which the general public is brought into the process, the
script for the play has been written, the cast of actors who will
play assigned roles has been carefully chosen, and the general
manager for the play has been picked. 4
49. D. BARRY, supra note 45, at 21.
50. "Thus the Constituent Assembly, which was to have been the crown of the bourgeois
parliamentary republic, could not but become an obstacle in the path of the October
Revolution and the Soviet power." Lenin, Draft Decree on the Dissolution of the Constituent
Assembly, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF COMMUNISM 133 (R. Daniels ed. 1960).
51. Id.
52. See Deutscher, Defeat in Victory, in THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, supra note 48, at 92, 100.
53. Id. at 93, 100.
54. VIII MODERN LEGAL SysTEMs CYCLOPEDIA 418, § 1.13(c) (K. Redden ed. 1985)
[hereinafter LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA]; see also Foster-Simons, Towards a More Perfect
Union: The Restructuring of Soviet Legislation, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 33 (1989).
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In Spring 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of
Soviets excluded from its membership the representatives of "an-
ti-Communist" socialist parties. 5 In this situation, the Bolsheviks decided
that it was the right time to give their power structures a constitutional
sanction. The leaders of the Revolution did not have any illusions as to
the declaratory character of the Constitution. The act was recognized as
a part of a superstructure that was supposed to describe rather than
prescribe the organization of power. Lenin himself did not take interest
in the constitutional works or comment on them in his writings. Edward
Carr wrote:
The period of drafting of the Constitution was one of grave and
continuous crisis both in economic and in external policy, which
threatened the existence of the regime and left little leisure for
smaller preoccupations. . . . The Constitution was scarcely
expected to last as a working instrument. . . . In these cir-
cumstances it is not surprising that the principal leaders themsel-
ves took no personal part in the work.56
On January 28, 1918, the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets
adopted a resolution "On the Federal Institutions of the Russian
Republic" in which it announced that the Central Executive Committee
(the "CEC") would prepare draft principles of the Constitution. 7 On
April 1, 1918, the CEC, following the decision of the Central Committee
of the Bolshevik Party, appointed a constitutional committee composed
of fifteen members such as Sverdlov, the President of the CEC, Stalin,
the Commissar of Nationalities, Bukharin, editor of Pravda, Pokrovskii, a
well-known Marxist professor, and Steklov, editor of Izvestiya.58 The
committee worked for three months and in July 1918 submitted the text
to the Fifth Congress of Soviets which adopted the Constitution on July
10, 1918.59 The adoption of the Constitution was followed by the killing
of the former Tsar with his wife, children, members of family, his
personal physician and three servants on July 17, 1918 in Ekaterinburg.
60
Two days later, on July 19, the Constitution, with its incorporated
55. Decree on the Expulsion of the Right Socialist Parties from the Soviets, reprinted
in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF COMMUNISM, supra note 50, at 156-58.
56. E. CARR, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1923, at 124 (1951).
57. See LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 54, at 423.
58. E. CARR, supra note 56, at 125.
59. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAw 159 (F. Feldbrugge, G. Van Den Berg, W.
Simons 2d rev. ed. 1985).
60. See L. Scy."Ro, Tv-tp COMMUNMr PARTY oF Tti SoviEr UNION 184 (1971); W.
CHAMBERLIN, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 60 (Universal Library ed. 1965).
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Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People (the "Declar-
ation of Rights of People") approved in January 1918, was formally
promulgated.61
The Declaration of Rights of People (located in the first four
chapters of the Constitution) was followed by General Provisions of the
Constitution. The General Provisions characterized the Russian Republic
as a federation which recognized equal rights of all citizens (Article 22),
guaranteed freedom of speech, opinion and assembly (Articles 14-15),
recognized freedom of conscience (Article 13), promised the separation
of the school and state from the church (Articles 13), and promulgated
general free education (Article 17). 62 The Constitution deprived "all
individuals and groups of individuals of the rights which could be utilized
by them to the detriment of the Socialist Revolution" (Article 23).63
With respect to work, the duty of every citizen of the Republic was
proclaimed in the Constitution's motto, "He shall not eat who does not
work."6'
The Constitution vested the supreme power of the Republic in the
All-Russia Congress of Soviets and, in periods between the convocation
of the Congress, in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.6
While the Fundamental Law referred to equal rights of all toilers, the
drafters of the Law were quite aware of the different interests of the
peasants and the workers. To counterbalance the considerable numerical
preponderance the peasants would have had over the workers if fully
equal suffrage had been adopted, the Law provided that "the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets is to be composed of representatives of urban Soviets
(one delegate for 25,000 voters) and of representatives of the provincial
congresses of Soviets (one delegate for 125,000 inhabitants)."" In this
way, the Constitution granted as much representation to one town dweller
as to five country dwellers. The All-Russian Congress was to elect an
All-Russian Central Executive Committee of not more than 200 members
which had the supreme legislative, executive and controlling power
between the convocation of the Congresses.67 "The general management
of the affairs of the Republic" was vested in The Council of People's
61. W. CHAMBERUN, supra note 60, at 60.
62. KONST. SSSR, reprined in THE NEw CONT=rIONS OF EUROPE 385-400 (H. McBain
& L. Rogers ed. 1922) [hereinafter KONST. SSSR (McBain ed.)]; KONST SSSR, reprinted in
CONSTITUnONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES 2-16 (J. Triska ed. 1968) [hereinafter
KONST. SSSR (Triska ed.)].
63. KONST. SSSR (McBain ed.), supra note 62, art. 23.
64. Id. art. 18.
65. Id. art. 12.
66. Id. art. 25.
67. Id. arts. 28, 30.
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Commissars appointed by the CEC.6 William H. Chamberlin com-
mented:
Many provisions of the Constitution were of purely theoretical
interest, because they were not carried out in practise [sic]. Real
power rested not with the Soviets, but with the Communist Party;
and those provisions of the Constitution which prescribed the
methods of election, the frequency of convening Soviet Congres-
ses, etc., were neglected or violated.69
VI. THE FIRST POST-REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTION OF 1924
William Munro observed that the Constitution of 1918 "was not
framed by men who had been elected for the purpose nor was it sub-
mitted to the Russian people for acceptance. But it served as a starting
point, and five years later became the model on which a [Constitution
for the entire Union of Socialist Soviet was framed."
70
The consolidation of Communist power in the Soviet Union required
the consideration of the nationality question. In order to restore a
centralized administration, the Bolsheviks had to formally prescribe the
links between Moscow and the non-Russian nationalities. The steps
toward federation came from the various republics and led to the
transformation of the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets into the
First Congress of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in December
1922. On December 30, 1922, the Congress declared that the state is a
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic. 71 The formal federate character
of the Union was to be confirmed by the new Constitution.
On January 10, 1923, the Presidium of the CEC appointed a commis-
sion headed by Stalin to draft the principles of the Constitution.7 "In
fact as the sequel showed, the crucial decisions on the [Clonstitution did
not rest either with the commission or with any organ of [the] state, but
rather with the Politburo or with some informal group of leaders within
the [P]arty."73 The new federal Constitution was adopted on July 6, 1923,
and ratified on January 31, 1924, shortly after Lenin's death.74
The Fundamental Law began with the Declaration of the Union of
the four republics: the Russian, the Ukrainian, the White Russian and
68. Id. arts. 35-37.
69. W. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 60, at 60.
70. W. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE 738 (1938).
71. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOvET' LAW, supra note 59, at 161.
72. Id.
73. E CAL supra note 56, at 399.
74. Id. at 409.
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the Transcaucasion, which consisted of the Republics of Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Armenia." The supreme authority was vested in the Soviet
Congress which still was composed of the representatives of the cities'
Soviets (in a proportion of one deputy for each 25,000 electors) and
provincial Soviets (one deputy for each 125,000 inhabitants). 76 The
sessions of the Congress were to convene once a year." The Central
Executive Committee of the Union, moreover, was a bicameral organ.
It consisted of the Council of the Union, a body of 371 members elected
by the Congress from among the representatives of the republics in
proportion to the population of each republic.78 The CEC also included
the Council of Nationalities which was composed of 131 delegates, five
from each union republic or autonomous republic and one from each
autonomous region. The delegates were elected by the executive
committee of the republic or region.79 In the intervals between sessions
of the CEC, supreme authority was further delegated to its Presidium
composed of twenty-one members.80 The Presidium was to be the highest
legislative, executive and administrative organ between the sessions of the
CEC.81 The Council of the People's Commissars remained the executive
and administrative organ responsible to the CEC and its Presidium. 1
Carr observed:
To sum up the changes in the Soviet structure resulting from the
1923 constitution is a difficult task. The student is confronted at
the outset by one curious paradox. The Russian Socialist Federal
Soviet Republic ("RSFSR") had the word "federal" in its title
and was constantly referred to as such; yet it was, in strict
constitutional terms, a unitary state, incorporating a number of
subordinate, though partially autonomous, units. In the
[Clonstitution of the USSR, (Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republic) and in official documents relating to it, the words
"federal" and "federation" were avoided. Yet the USSR was, in
essential points, a federation.n
75. KONST. SSSR (Triska ed.), supra note 62, § 1 Declaration; § 2 Covenant.
76. Id. art. 3, §§ 8-9.
77. Id. art. i1.
78. The number of representatives to the Council of the Union was increased by the
Second Congress to 414. See E. CARR, supra note 56, at 401.
79. KONST. SSSR (Triska ed.), supra note 62, art. 4, § 14.
80. See id. art. 4, § 26.
81. Id. art. 6, §§ 37, 41.
82. Id. art. 31.
83. E. CARR, supra note 56, at 406-07.
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VII. THE STALIN CONSTITUTION OF 1936
After the years of war-communism, Stalinist Russia entered the
period of collectivization of agriculture and industrialization. The years
1932 to 1933 were stigmatized by the so-called "forgotten holocaust" - the
famine in the Ukraine-when Stalin was dumping millions of tons of
wheat on the Western markets, while in the Ukraine, men, women, and
children were dying of starvation at the rate of 25,000 a day, Le., seven-
teen human beings a minute.8s Seven to ten million people perished in
a famine caused not by war or natural disaster, but by a ruthless decree.'
The famine was followed by period of purges in the Party and falsified
trials which resulted in the arrest and execution of hundreds of thousands
of people.86 In the midst of the "great terror," Stalin announced his will
to adopt a new Constitution. The Constitution was to be an element of
Stalin's "cover-up" of the atrocities of his system. It was "to convince
the world that the Soviet Union was, after all, a state run according to
law."91 Victor Kravchenko, a defector from the Soviet Union, noted:
To survive, man needs hope even as he needs air. Like millions
of others, I reached out for the promise of more human rights for
the ordinary Soviet citizen. We grasped at the straw of hope to
save ourselves from sinking to the lower depths of despondency.
Except for the minority of hard-bitten cynics, to whom the
Constitution was just one more hoax, Communists especially
wanted to believe8s
The new Constitution was to democratize electoral law and to declare
that the Soviet Union, after eliminating its antagonistic classes, was to
become the society of all the people.89
On February 1, 1934, on Stalin's motion, the Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Party instructed the Chairman of the Council of
Commissars, Molotov, to present to the forthcoming Seventh Congress of
Soviets, a proposal to amend the Constitution.9 In February 1935, the
CEC formed a constitutional commission.91 It was formally chaired by
84. See Harvest of Despair, film and documents collected by the Ukrainian Famine
Research Committee (1981).
85. Id.
86. D. BARRY, supra note 45, at 78.
87. Id.
88. V. KRAvcHENKo, I CHosE FREEDoM 198 (1989).
89. See V. CHI-IKVADzE, SoviEr STATE AND LAw 218 (1969).
90. LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 54, at 421.
91. Id.
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Stalin and consisted of a thirty-one member panel.Y The commission
included Nikolai Bukharin who later confided that "he alone, with a little
assistance from Radek, had written the document 'from first word to
last."'" In Spring 1936, the Commission prepared a draft of a new
constitution which was submitted for nationwide discussion. The draft
was a full-fledged show of the work of democratic centralism. In late
April, Stalin made preparations for the trial and execution of "Trotskyi-
te-Zonovievite Terrorist Centre," but the Party of propaganda claimed
that "[ejveryone was talking about the Stalin IConstitution."94 Stalin's
decorative deceit was fully successful. On June 1, 1936, a Plenum of the
Central Committee approved the draft and on December 5, 1936, the
Eighth Extraordinary Congress unanimously adopted the final text of the
Constitution. December 5 was declared a national holiday-Day of the
Constitution. The Soviet newspapers exclaimed:
Let the balalaikas ring, Raise anew the chorus, Isn't it a happy
thing-The road that lies before us?9
Article 1 of the Constitution declared that the Union of Soviet
Republics was a "socialist state of workers and peasants."9 The Con-
stitution introduced the concepts of a secret ballot and equal franchise to
peasants and city dwellers. In addition, deputies to all Soviets of Work-
ing People were to be chosen on the basis of "universal, equal and direct
suffrage by secret ballot."97 The Constitution recognized the right to
work, rest and leisure,9 the right to maintenance in old age and sick-
ness,9 the right to education, 10 equal rights for women and for all citizens
irrespective of nationality or race, 10 1 freedom of religion,102 freedom of
speech, press, assembly and demonstration, 103 freedom of association,1"
92. Id.
93. S. COHEN, 1BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION. A PoImcAL BIOGRAPHY,
1888-1938, at 356-57 (1973).
94. Id. at 366-67.
95. W. MUNRO, supra note 70, at 744.
96. KONST. SSSR, reprinted in CONSTIMrIONS OF NATIONS 262-82 (2d ed. 1956)
[hereinafter KONST. SSSR (Peaslee ed.)].
97. Id. art. 134.
98. Id. arts. 118-19.
99. Id. art. 120.
100. Id. art. 121.
101. Id. arts. 122-23.
102. Id. art. 124.
103. Id. art. 125.
104. Id. art. 126.
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and guarantees against inviolability of the person,14 5 domicile and
correspondence. 106
The Constitution substituted the Congress of Soviets and the Central
Executive Committee with one bicameral organ of legislative power, the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, comprised of
the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.10 The Soviet of
the Union was to be elected on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000
of the population? °0 The Soviet of Nationalities was elected by the same
universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage on the basis of twenty-five
deputies for each union republic, eleven for each autonomous republic,
five for each autonomous region, and one for each national area.1°9
Executive power belonged to the Council of Ministers of the USSR110
which was to be appointed by, and responsible to, the Supreme Soviet;
between sessions it was to be responsible to the Presidium."' The
Presidium was composed of thirty-three members elected by a joint sitting
of both chambers.112
In the symptomatic way for Stalin's era, two years after the Constitu-
tion was adopted, the main drafters of the "most democratic Constitution
in the world,"" 3 including Bukharin and Radek, were condemned to death
for espionage, terrorism, and conspiracy. As a result of the "show trials,"
the "old guard" of Bolsheviks was executed: in 1936, Zinovev, Kamenev,
Smirnov; in 1937, Radek, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov; in 1938, Bukharin, Rikov,
Krestinsky, Rakovsky and Yagoda." 4 Leonard Schapiro wrote:
When the smoke of battle lifted the pattern of the operation
became discernible. Most of the old native leaders who still
survived in 1937 had now disappeared. But below them,
considerable inroads had also been made into the network of
subordinate secretaries, those men who had been trained during
the 30s. In the Ukraine, for example, in 1938, nearly half of the
secretaries of [P]arty organizations were once again replaced. In
Georgia, between early 1937 and early 1939, 260 out of a total
of less than three hundred first, second and third secretaries of
105. Id. art. 127.
106. Id. art. 128.
107. Id. arts. 32-33.
108. Id. art. 34.
109. Id. art. 35.
110. Id. art. 64.
111. Id. arts. 65, 70.
112. Id. art. 48.
113. See V. KRtaVCioNKO, supra note 88, at 198.
114. TiH SoviaEr CRUCIBLE, supra note 48, at 137-44.
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local [Plarty committees were replaced, as well as several
thousand other [Plarty officials. It was a salutary lesson to those
who wished to rise in the [Plarty that nothing less than complete
subordination of national interests to the interests of the USSR,
as decided by the [Plarty leaders in Moscow, would be ac-
cepted.115
VIII. POST-STALINIST CONSTITUTION OF 1977
Stalin's death resulted not only in a wave of popular unrest- revolt
of East German workers in 1953, turbulence in Siberian camps soon
afterward and upheavals of Hungarian and Polish workers three years
later-but in attempts to reassess the significance of communism in the
Soviet bloc. Thousands of political prisoners were released from labor
camps; they had had enough time to realize that some mechanisms of
the system were obsolete and needed rapid modernization.
"De-Stalinization," no matter how serious its concessions, undoubtedly
stimulated widespread discussion over the theory and practice of com-
munism. The discussion also embraced the area of constitutional
regulations.
The constitution-making process, which this time lasted over fifteen
years, was heralded even more pompously by Stalin's successors. Robert
Sharlet wrote:
The drafting, discussion, revision, and ratification of the 1977
constitution reflected the scope and limits of de-Stalinization as
it affected the policy-making process. Comparing the "making"
of the constitutions of 1936 and 1977, it is apparent that the high
concentration of political resources and the severely restricted
access to policy-making arenas that were characteristic of
Stalinism have given way to a greater dispersal of political
resources and far more access to these arenas in the post-Stalin
period. An obvious comparative measure is that the 1936
constitution was little more than a year and a half in the making,
including the public discussion, while preparation of the 1977
constitution required nearly two decades of intermittent activity.
Certain similarities are evident in the constitution-making
processes of 1936 and 1977. Stalin had formally chaired the
constitutional commission, and his successors Khrushchev and
Brezhnev later followed suit, underscoring that a new Soviet
115. L. SCHAPIRO, supra note 60, at 482-83. See generally Pravda, June 16, 1938, at 1
(discussion of the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party); Pravda, Mar. 21, 1939, at I
(editorial on dedication to Party work).
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constitution was considered not merely a technical instrument of
government but a policy statement of some magnitude. Secondly,
the political symbolism of the two documents is similar; both
followed periods of intensive internal change. . . . Finally, the
ultimate products, the constitutions of 1936 and 1977, were
intended to consolidate, institutionalize, and legitimate Stalinism
and post-Stalin reform respectively. 1 6
There was an enormous number of amendments introduced into the Stalin
Constitution, and it was apparent that rather than amending the old
Constitution again, a new Constitution had to be drafted.17 The
Constitutional Commission was set up in 1962 and originally consisted
of ninety-seven members.118 The Commission's draft, adopted by the
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union on May 24, 1977, was subject to a further nationwide discussion in
the media during which over 150 amendments and clarifications were
made.119 At the seventh extraordinary session of the Ninth Convocation
of the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 7, 1977, the Constitution was
adopted.12 Christopher Osakwe commented:
To the Western student of Soviet constitutional law, the adoption
of the long-awaited USSR Constitution of 1977 will go down in
history as the greatest non-event of the decade. Despite all
official proclamations to the contrary, the new document does not
break any new ground in Soviet law. It creates no meaningful
new expectations in the minds of the ordinary Soviet citizens, and
it fails to promulgate a new developmental policy for Soviet
society. Nevertheless, a deliberate effort was made to involve a
cross section of the Soviet population in the last stages of its
adoption. The impact of this citizen involvement is
questionable.'2'
116. Sharlet, De-Stalinization and Soviet Constitutionalism, in THE SOVIET UNION SINCE
STALIN 94 (S. Cohen, A. Rabinowitch & R. Sharlet ed. 1980).
117. Between 1937 and 1974, the Stalin Constitution was amended 250 times, affecting
73 of the original 146 articles. LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 54, at 508. For
details on amendments, see S. RUSINOVA & V. RIANZHIN, SOVETSKOE KONsTISIONNOE
PRAVo 81-85 (1975).
118. In 1966, the size of the Commission was reduced to 75 members; in early 1977 to
54 members; and finally in April 1977 it increased by 21 new members. See R. SHARLET,
THE NEW SOVIET CONsTrrtrnos oF 1977, at 1-4, 26 (1978); see also LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDtA, supra note 54, at 420.
119. Sharlet, supra note 116, at 96.
120. Id.
121. LEGAL SysTEMs CYCLOPEDtA, supra note 54, at 421.
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Comparing the Fundamental Laws of 1936 and 1977, it is apparent
that the changes introduced should not be overestimated. The Act of
1977 did not refer to the "society of workers and peasants."'2 The state
was not portrayed as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" but as a "society
of the whole people," "the unbreakable alliance of the workers, peasants,
and intelligentsia."'m The Constitution emphasized the democratic
foundations of the Soviet system.124 It declared that the Soviet state is
organized on the principle of democratic centralism which "combines
central leadership with local initiative and creative activity."m The
leading and guiding role of the Communist Party was formally recognized
by the Constitution. 6 The Constitution introduced separate chapters on
"The Economic System," 2l on "Social Development and Culture"1 and
on "Foreign Policy." 129 The chapter on the basic rights of citizens was
extended, and the links between rights and duties were strongly em-
phasized. The Constitution declared that the "[ejnjoyment of citizens of
their rights and freedoms must not be to the detriment of the interests
of society or the state, or infringe the rights of other citizens,"'' 10 meaning
that citizens' rights are constitutionally guaranteed only when exercised in
a manner corresponding to the interests of society as defined by the
Party, "the nucleus of the Soviet political system."
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR remained the highest body of state
authority.131 The bicameral body of 1500 deputies was, as previously,
composed of two chambers equal in numbers.132 Moreover, the Supreme
Soviet remained the most effective legislative body in the world. It was
expected to approve a significant number of legal instruments during two
relatively short convocations a year, with essentially no dissent permitted.
The Presidium remained a permanent nucleus of the legislative body and
122. See KONsT. SSSR of 1977, translated in BAsic DOCUMENTS ON THE SoVIET LEGAL
SysrEM (W. Butler trans. 1983) [hereinafter KONsr. SSSR of 19771.
123. Id. arts. 1, 2, 19.
124. Id. art. 9.
125. Id. art. 3.
126. Id. art. 6.
127. Id. arts. 10-18.
128. Id. arts. 19-27.
129. Id. arts. 28-30.
130. Id. art. 39.
131. Id. art. 108.
132. The representation of Union Republics in the Soviet of Nationalities was slightly
changed. In the new, Constitution each Republic has 32 instead of the previous 25
deputies. Id. art. 110.
[Vol. 10
SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
the Council of Ministers was designated as the highest executive and
administrative body.133
IX. GORBACHEV'S LAW ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
There is some routine in the process of making constitutional changes
in the socialist system. The initiative usually stems from the Politburo or
Secretary General himself' 4 It is typical that the process begins after the
initial period of solidification of power of the Party leader. Each
transitory period in the Soviet Union may be characterized, however, by
the tendency to set up a more collective leadership of the Party, and this
period was followed by the emergence of a single leader who successfully
reduced the number of rivals and introduced his clients to the highest
Party bodies. This tendency may be traced through Stalin's triumvirates,m
Khrushchev's temporary readiness to share power with Anastas Mikoyan
and Brezhnev's coalition with Aleksey Kosygin. 1-6 The tendency to purge
the Politburo and the Central Committee of potential rivals was not only
typical of the pre-glasnost era: the full Politburo members and a substan-
tial part of the Central Committee are Gorbachev's appointees. Gor-
bachev's position as primus inter pares (first among equal) was clearly
confirmed, although it by no means signifies the inevitable success of his
reforms.
In this situation, the will to amend the constitutional law in the
direction that would reflect innovations in political philosophy of the new
leader is natural. According to the Soviet tradition, the constitutional
changes were to crown the Party leader's victory over his rivals. It is
paradoxical, however, that the process of consolidation of power was
always accompanied by the declarations of the democratic evolution of
the system. Each new Constitution was portrayed as an apex in the
long-lasting process of democratization. Gorbachev's constitutional reform
is no exception to this principle.
On October 22, 1988, drafts of the Law on Constitutional Amend-
ments were submitted for nationwide discussion. Similar to the period
preceding the adoption of Stalin Constitution and the Constitution of
1977, the media announced enormous involvement of the readers whose
political maturity was assessed very highly. Pravda reported:
133. Id. arts. 119-24, 128-36.
134. See LEGAL SYSTEMS CycLoPEDtA, supra note 54, at 418.
135. See E. CARP, THE INTERREGNUM, 1923-1924, at 257 (1960).
136. In 1964 Mikoyan rose to the rank of President of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet but the following year he resigned this office for reasons of ill health. In 1964
Kosygin was elevated to the Premier position. He resigned in 1980 for the same reasons
as Mikoyan.
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The most distinctive feature of today's stage in our society's
renewal is that millions of Soviet people have emerged from a
state of political apathy and are adopting active civic stances. The
reform of the political system should be the most important lever
for further boosting this activeness of the people and directing it
into a single creative channel. 3
7
On December 1, 1988, the Supreme Soviet unanimously approved,
by separate voting in the two chambers, the USSR Law on Elections of
USSR People's Deputies and approved the USSR Draft Laws on Changes
and Amendments to the USSR Constitution by 1344 deputy votes for, five
against and twenty-seven abstentionsYm
Widely heralded changes of the electoral system are quite vague and
must be examined with cool skepticism. Article 95 of the Law on
Constitutional Amendments provides that "[ellections of people's deputies
take place in a single-seat and multiseat electoral districts on the basis of
universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot."'3 9 Amended Article
100 provides for multiple nominations; it reads, "Ballot papers can include
any number of candidates." 140
The reform inspires several observations. At first, the extent to which
multiseat electoral districts are to be introduced is not clear. The Law
on Elections of People's Deputies provides that "elections of USSR
people's deputies take place in a single-seat electoral districts."1 41 "One
USSR people's deputy is elected per electoral okrug." 142 Multiseat
electoral districts will be tested instead in elections of local Soviet
people's deputies.' 0 Secondly, multicandidate elections are not Gor-
bachev's innovation. It was confirmed that Stalin spoke favorably about
them to Roy Howard in 1936 although this concept did not materialize
137. Denokratazatiya nashay zhizni (Democratization in Our Tune), Pravda, Oct. 25,
1988, at 1.
138. Tass, Dec. 1, 1988, extracted in Constitutional Amendments Approved, FBIS-SOV-
88-231, Dec. 1, 1988, at 46-47.
139. USSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental
Law), reprinted in Pravda, Dec. 3, 1988, at 1-2 (1st ed.), translated and ertracted in Law on
Constitutional Amendments, FI3IS-SOV-88-233, Dec. 5, 1988, at 48-58 [hereinafter
Constitutional Amendments].
140. Id. at 50.
141. USSR Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies, reprinted in Pravda, Dec. 4,
1988, at 1-3 (1st ed.), translated and oxtracted in Law on Elections of Deputies, FBIS-SOV-
89-233, Dec. 5, 1988, at 35 [hereinafter Deputy Elections Law].
142. Id. art. 15, at 37.
143. See Democratization in Our Time, supra note 137; see also Constitutional
Amendments, supra note 139, art. 95.
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in his Constitution of 1936.144 Until recently, however, only one person
would run for each seat in an uncontested election with a high electorate
participation. Vyshinsky wrote:
Under the new Stalin Constitution elections to the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR and to the Supreme Soviets of Union and
Autonomous Republics have shown that the entire population of
the land of the Soviets are completely united in spirit, have
demonstrated an unprecedented democracy. The days of
elections have actually been festive days of the entire people,
when the bloc of Party and non-Party Bolsheviks have elected
their best people to the Supreme Soviets. The call of the
Bolshevik Party to the Soviet people, to all the electors, the vote
for candidates of the bloc of the Communists and the non-Party
members had exceptional results. In the voting for the candidates
to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 91,113,153 electors out of
94,138,159 took part-96.8 percent of the entire number of
citizens having the right to vote.14
The multi-seat districts were tested in other socialist countries. They
were introduced in Poland where usually between four and six representa-
tives are elected in one district, and in the German Democratic Republic
where four to ten representatives may be elected from one list. The 1983
Reform of the Hungarian electoral system also introduced the system of
double or multiple nominations confirming at the same time the primacy
of individual districts.14 The multi-seat system or system of multiple
nominations did not democratize the electoral law of these countries ipso
facto. It is well-known that the democratic electoral system of the
socialist countries broke down as a result of a combination of a few major
elements: defective nomination process, defective secrecy, and a lack of
adequate and reliable public control of the elections' results.
The nomination phase, one of the most sensitive and important
elements of the democratic electoral process, was seriously affected by
the system, which granted the right to nominate candidates to branches
and organizations of the Communist Party (the "CPSU"), trade unions,
Young Communist League, co-operatives, and other public organizations,
work collectives, and meetings of servicemen.147 The new Law on
Elections of People's Deputies provides that new representatives will be
144. A. VYSHINSKY, THE LAw OF THE SovIET STATE at vii (1948).
145. Id. at 722.
146. See Dezso, Socialist Electoral Systems and the 1983 Hungarian Reform, in YEARBooK
ON SOCALuST LEGAL SYSTEMS 45-46 (W. Butler ed. 1986).
147. KONsT. SSSR of 1977, supra note 122, art. 100.
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nominated by labor collectives, social organizations and servicemen's
meetings. 149 The change seems to be less significant in light of amended
laws recently changed again, which provided that at least one-third of
people's deputies had to be elected from the members of the CPSU, trade
unions, cooperative organizations, the Komsomol, associations of women,
war and labor veterans, and scientific workers, creative unions and other
social organizations. 149 In practice, the creative activity of an average
citizen during the process of nomination was strongly limited, and thus,
the results of the nomination process were well-prepared in advance. An
average citizen was intimidated rather than encouraged to take part in
this process, however, Pravda notes:
Now the situation is changing, although this is not happening
everywhere or all at once. This is facilitated by the tremendous
preparatory work that has preceded the report election meetings
and conferences. Lists of [Plarty committees or bureau can-
didates have been published in advance so that they could be
discussed comprehensively. Use has been made of questionnaires
in order to discover people's opinion of the possible candidates.
Non-[Plarty members have been invited to the conferences which
also helps stimulate collective discussion.
This report sounds promising, however, it again resembles Vyshinky's
report on the electoral activity under Stalin's Constitution:
Never in a single country did the people manifest such activity in
elections as did the Soviet people. Never has any capitalist
country known, nor can it know, such a high percentage of those
participating in voting as did the USSR. The Soviet election
system under [the] Stalin Constitution and the elections of
Supreme Soviets have shown the entire world once again that
Soviet democracy is the authentic sovereignty of the people of
which the best minds of mankind have dreamed.Ul
In reality, the reports from the ten-week election campaign that
commenced on January 10, 1989, confirm the reservations drawn from
the initial examination of the text of the Law on Elections.152 The 100
148. See Constitutional Amendments, supra note 139, art. 100; Deputy Elections Law,
supra note 141, art. 24.
149. Constitutional Amendments, supra note 139, art. 95; see also Democratization in
Our Time, supra note 137.
150. Strogii Examen (Strict Examination), Pravda, Oct. 18, 1988, at 1.
151. A VysHiNsKY, supra note 144, at 724.
152. See Dobbs, Party Still Holds Key to Soviet Electons, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1989, at
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seats allocated to the Soviet Communist Party were filled by decision of
the Politburo, which was endorsed by the Central Committee.153 Western
observers reported from Moscow:
Today's selection of approved Communist Party candidates
provided a dramatic reminder of the Kremlin's ability to
manipulate what have been billed as the most democratic
elections in Soviet history. The [Plarty has managed to devise
new electoral rules that guarantee it a virtual monopoly of
political power behind the trappings of parliamentary
democracy. 4
The new system produced some multicandidate elections for the seats
that are not allocated to social organizations. The choice was limited,
however, even for this section of the Congress. The new amended laws
guaranteed representation to such organizations as stamp collectors,
book-lovers, and "friends of cinema," but not to independent mass
movements such as Memorial, which has been supported by millions of
people.15s Dobbs writes from Moscow:
Last week's nominating session of the filatelists' association
provided an excellent opportunity to see how the system works
in practice. The meeting was called to choose candidates to fill
the one seat in Congress reserved for the representative of the
Soviet Union's 300,000 stamp-collectors. . . . In the case of
candidates who have been endorsed by the [Plarty, all obstacles
have a miraculous tendency to disappear. Unofficial candidates,
by contrast, usually find that they are required to fulfill every
exacting detail of the electoral law. 6
This reflection is also true as far as non-allocated seats are con-
cerned. The observation of the initial phase of the election process
confirms that despite the attempts to portray the campaign as Western-st-
yle, its outcome on March 26, 1989, which gave 80% of seats in the
Congress to the Communist Party, was easily predictable,
The actual casting of ballots was usually another element that
affected the democratic character of the socialist election process. The
A15, col. 5.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Dobbs, Sakhorav Seeking Stamp of Approval, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1989, at A14,
cl. 2.
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voter, before obtaining a ballot paper, had to identify himself and check
his or her name on the list of voters. The Party propaganda claimed that
the voter should cast a valid ballot simply by dropping it in the ballot box.
This procedure was recognized as evidence of trust for the Party
candidates who were located at the beginning of the list. In this case,
even if the list had more candidates than seats allocated to this electoral
district, the first candidates on the list would be deemed voted on. The
voting booths were usually located at the distant part of the electoral
rooms. To vote secretly, the voter had to pass by the whole room in the
full view of Party representatives present. 5 7 The lack of trust in the
elective practice (electoral rolls and the procedure for their compilation;
counting votes in the electoral wards), created the atmosphere of futility
and hopelessness that worked against the attempts to vote secretly. In
addition, the Party's backstage propaganda discretely persuaded the voter
to remember that the electoral behavior of the members of society would
be carefully watched by the Party and would affect the assessment of
individual contribution to the social well-being, a basic factor in the
process of distribution of social goods. To illustrate this approach on the
example of the Polish system (which nota bene provided for multiple-seat
constituencies and recently was radically democratized), Dr. Wrobel wrote:
On September 26, 1985, just prior to the Seym "elections"
Minister Miskiewicz announced, at a meeting of university
chancellors, that the participation of Polish academic teachers in
the "election" would be the criteria to judge whether or not these
academics were in conformance with the constitutional principles
of the Polish Peoples Republic. In practice, this meant that
refusing to participate in "voluntary elections" could lead to the
refusal to grant degrees, academic titles and even loss of job.
For the perspective of Polish law, the minister acted criminally
since according to Article 189.1 of the Polish Penal Code
whoever by force, illegal threat, deceit or exploitation of
dependency interferes with the free exercise of election rights is
subject to the loss of freedom from six months to five years.
Unfortunately, Polish law is treated instrumentally by the ruling
group, as tool serving exclusively to maintain power. The
Minister is free.158
A reform of the legislative structures which was to shift power from
the Party to the representative bodies was widely heralded as another
157. Id.; see L. SCHAPIRO, supra note 60, at 458.
158. J. Wrobel, The Drama of Polish Education Continues, STUDIUM PAPERS, Jan. 1987,
at 3.
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major element of constitutional restructuring. A Pravda editorial
declared:
The draft laws are the legal foundation for the reform.... The
soviets of people's deputies proved powerless. The work of law
enforcement organs weakened drastically.... The additions and
amendments to the USSR Constitution and the new law on
elections are extensive. They are aimed primarily at the
democratization of our entire life and the return of power to the
soviets of people's deputies, placing them above all other state
institutions. It is essentially a case of full power for the people.139
The amended Fundamental Laws draw from the tradition of the first
Constitutions (1918 and 1924) which provided for a double legislative
body: the Congress and its nucleus Central Executive Committee, itself a
bicameral body since 1924. The new Law vested the supreme power in
the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.160 The Congress was to consist
of 2250 elected deputies who were comprised of the following: 750
territorial electoral districts with an equal number of voters; 750 from
national-territorial electoral districts (thirty-two deputies from each union
republic, eleven deputies from each autonomous republic, five deputies
from each autonomous region, and one deputy from each autonomous
area); and 750 deputies from all-union social organizations (CPSU elects
100 deputies, USSR trade unions elect 100 deputies, cooperative or-
ganizations elect 100 deputies, Komsomol elects seventy-five deputies,
women's councils elect seventy-five deputies, organizations of war and
labor veterans elect seventy-five deputies, associations of scientific workers
elect seventy-five deputies, USSR creative unions elect seventy-five
deputies and other legally constituted social organizations elect seventy-
five deputies).1 61 The reservation of a bloc of one-third of the seats for
the CPSU and other social organizations was recognized as "a controver-
sial departure from Western practice,"162 and was currently abandoned by
the subsequent amendment which was adopted under the pressure of a
group of progressivists in the Congress.
The Congress elects its nucleus body, a 450-person, bicameral, USSR
Supreme Soviet which is "the standing legislative, administrative and
159. Democratization in Our Time, supra note 137.
160. Constitutional Amendments, supra note 139, art. 108.
161. Deputy Elections Law, supra note 141, arts. 15, 17, 18. For the full text of article
18, see Pravda, Dec. 4, 1989, at 1.
162. Dobbs, Gorbachev Appeals for Political Reforms, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1988, at A34,
col. 1.
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monitoring organ of the USSR state power." 161 The USSR Supreme
Soviet has two chambers: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of
Nationalities, which are numerically equal and possess equal rights.1"
The chambers are elected at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies by
a general vote by the deputies.1" The Soviet of the Union is elected
from among the USSR people's deputies from the territorial electoral
districts and the USSR people's deputies from the social organizations. 166
The Soviet of Nationalities is elected from among the USSR people's
deputies from the national-territorial electoral districts and from the social
organizations in accordance with the following norms: eleven deputies
from each union republic, four deputies from each autonomous republic,
two deputies from each autonomous region and one deputy from each
autonomous area.167
X. CONCLUSION
Is the reform a major sign of the restructuring of the Soviet legal
system? Given a kaleidoscope of political changes sweeping the Soviet
bloc the answer hardly may be rendered at the moment. The well-balanc-
ed assessment of the constitutional changes requires time and examina-
tion of their application in practice. With the Soviet empire dissolving
and crumbling, rather than reconstituting, each change begets some
unpredictable change and requires a permanent evaluation of upcoming
events. This situation allows only a few conclusions.
Although the overall reaction of the Western media was favorable,
it must be cautiously noted that the laws hardly introduced any new
elements into the socialist constitutional framework. The functioning of
the double legislative body composed of the huge Congress and a smaller,
but still bicameral, nucleus organ (the Central Executive Committee or
Supreme Soviet), was well-tested in the 1920s and 1930s. The Soviet
practice demonstrates that the Congresses of several thousands of
delegates are handicapped by their size and are typically more responsive
to the Party rhetoric. The organization of the Party congresses proves
that they may be prepared carefully in advance and may be held in an
atmosphere encouraging no symbolic or dissenting debate.
The first session of the convened Congress did not bring major
surprises but demonstrated, however, that perestroika is a risky game and
that Gorbachev is not clearly in control of the forces he has unleashed.16s
163. Constitutional Amendments, supra note 139, ch. 15.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Trimble, Reform is Risky Business, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, June 19, 1989,
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Gorbachev easily won unanimous nomination by the Party and was
elected President facing only symbolic opposition of the Congress, which
is composed of 80% of the members of the Communist Party.169 In the
voting Gorbachev's word still prevails, however, the deputies voted down
the government's candidates to the Supreme Soviet commissions.1 Jeff
Trimble wrote from Moscow that "when it came to talking, arguing,
shouting, criticizing and insulting, this Congress bowed to no one."17
Elected by the clear Party majority, the Supreme Soviet gave Gorbachev
less clear control over the proceedings than was expected. The number
of radical deputies, who occupied up to 30% of the seats in the Congress,
was reduced to between 10 and 15 percent in the Supreme Soviet.
Nonetheless, Gorbachev faced unexpectedly strong opposition against his
nomination of Politburo member, Anatoly Lukyanov, as first deputy
chairman of the Supreme Soviet and in several votes on national
minorities issues.17
The new laws raise an array of concerns, especially in the northern
republics of the Soviet Union. The widely heralded, but vaguely imple-
mented, shift of power from the Party to the legislature was accompanied
by restrictions on public demonstrations and the freedom of association.173
The tide of resistance to communism and to Russian domination swept
among the Soviet captive nationalities in 1989 and put Gorbachev under
tremendous pressure. By unanimous vote, the Lithuanian legislature
declared the 1940 annexation of its country by the Soviet Union void, and
the Communist Party of Lithuania separated itself from Moscow center.174
The Estonian Parliament voted on the controversial residency require-
ment (later suspended), in its new election law. 75 In spite of Moscow's
warnings, the Lithuanians and Estonians followed East European
countries and abolished the clause in their constitutions giving the
Communist Party a leading position, in fact, a monopoly of power.176
at 27-28.
169. Remnick,' Sakharov Sees Gorbachev at Risk, Wash. Post, June 22, 1989, at A34,
col. 1.
170. Id.
171. Trimble, supra note 168, at 28.
172. Dobbs, Soviet Reforners Suffer Broad Defeat in Key Legislative Vote, Wash. Post,
May 28, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
173. See Remnick, Angry Estonians to Discuss Changes in Constitution, Wash. Post, Nov.
4, 1988, at A30, col. 1.
174. See Keller, Lithuania Declares Annexation by Moscow Void, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24,
1989, at A5, col. 1.
175. See Fein, Estonia Suspends Part of Disputed Vote Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989,
at A9, col. 1.
176. Remnick, Multi-Pany Plan Adopted by Lithuania, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1989, at Al,
col. 6.
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Under the pressure of grass-roots movements the Supreme Soviet granted
them economic autonomy beginning January 1, 1990.77 The discussions
on the democratization process in the Baltic Republics proved that the
Supreme Soviet lost its old rubber-stamp character and may give Gor-
bachev a feeling of his own powerlessness.
The evolution of the electoral districts have been introduced only in
the local elections, and the practice of other socialist countries
demonstrates that they are not ipso facto a guarantee of democratization
of the electoral process. Double and multiple nominations were theoreti-
cally possible under the old electoral Soviet laws. The practice showed,
however, that either the candidates themselves, or organizations that had
nominated them, would frequently drop their names. Finally, any
alternative names were submitted and single candidates ran for each seat
uncontested.
Soviet law adopted a rule that constitutionally guaranteed rights of
citizens must not exist to the detriment of the interests of society or the
state. 78 Freedoms of speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions
and demonstrations are still guaranteed only if they are exercised in a
manner not contrary to the interests of the people and are exercised in
order to strengthen and develop socialist system.179  Until recently
"interests of the people" and "needs of socialism" were defined only by
the Party and the government. It was assumed that the legislative body
itself was responsible for maintaining the constitutionality of state actions
and that constitutional review could not be exercised by extra-parliamen-
tary bodies. Constitutional control was usually reserved for internal
organs of the legislative bodies such as the Presidium of the parent
body.'8 Supervision over the observance of laws was vested in the
Procurator-General who was appointed by, and responsible and account-
able to, the supreme legislative body.181 It has already been proven that
the Polish experience of judicial review contributed significantly to the
liberalization of the legal system in this country.182 It has to be emphati-
cally stated again that without the extra-parliamentary, namely judicial,
means of constitutional control, the provisions of the Soviet electoral
reforms still sound like political-philosophical declarations rather than
legally binding norms. Without social and judicial control of the election
177. Remnick, Baltics Given Economic Autonomy, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1989, at A27,
col. 4.
178. KONST. SSSR of 1977, supra note 122, art. 39.
179. Id. arts. 50-51.
180. Id. art. 121.
181. Id. arts. 164-65.
182. See Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal Systen Current Developments,
37 INm & COMp. L Q. 89-108 (1988).
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process, the slogan of a "free election" must be checked carefully against
well-known socialist past experience.
The modified system initially did not introduce any elements of
political pluralism. The Constitutional Amendments guarantee that
one-third of the deputies would be elected from the all-union social
organizations controlled by the CPSU. The remaining two-thirds of the
candidates were nominated by labor collectives and there were weak
indications that they could be selected from the non Party-controlled
electorate. In this situation, the new USSR Supreme Soviet might
theoretically accept only nominal dissent and might be, in fact, an
institution with the same profile as the old Supreme Soviet which was
called to applaud the Party's decisions.
The practice proved, however, that the character of the Supreme
Soviet is changing noticeably. The new vote on the election law, on
October 24, 1989, was a startling victory for progressives, who voted to
delete the provision that set aside one-third of the People's Deputies in
the Congress for the Communist Party, unions, cultural organizations. 1 3
The most recent comments from Moscow also demonstrate that the
Kremlin is inclined to eliminate the law guaranteeing the Communist
Party's monopoly on power. 184 The practice will verify this new Soviet
readiness to experiment with political pluralism.
The evaluation of the personal position of Gorbachev is, in this
situation, extremely difficult. His nomination to the position of the
President of the Supreme Soviet enhanced his power in light of the new
constitutional law. The new law limits the tenure for this position to ten
years (two five-year successive terms), but extends the functions of the
President as a head of the state who now chairs the powerful Defense
Council and names candidates for the posts of Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, USSR General Prosecutor, Chairman of the USSR
Supreme Court, and other high officials. The combination of the position
of the General Secretary of the Party with the presidency and the
announced combination of the equivalent positions on the local level can
hardly favor the announced "revival of the absolute power of the
soviets."181
On February 27, 1990, the draft law was approved and marked the
further shift in power from the Communist Party and the Soviet legisla-
ture to the President, who in March 1990 is to be elected to a four-year
183. Tass, Oct. 24, 1989, extracted in Supreme Soviet Approves Amendments on Elections,
FBIS-SOV-89-205, Oct. 25, 1989, at 72-74.
184. Remnick, Pravda.. 1-Party Rule Subject to Change, Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 1989, at 21,
col. 5.
185. Tass, Oct. 22, 1988, extracted in Changes 'To Enhance Democracy,' FBIS-SOV-88-
205, Oct. 24, 1988, at 50.
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term by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Further, elections for
five-year terms will be by nationwide popular vote.
186
Gorbachev's strategy resembles the tactics employed in Poland before
the declaration of marshall law in 1981 when the concentration of power
was the first indication of possible confrontation with Solidarity.187 The
appointment of General Jaruzelski to the principle post of the State (First
Secretary of the Central Committee, Prime Minister, Secretary of
Defense), suggested that some action against Solidarity was being prepar-
ed.1M The recent Gorbachev bill makes a similar crackdown on the
growing Soviet opposition equally possible.
With all power vested in him, Gorbachev seems to be vulnerable and
more exposed on the criticism of the Party's conservatives and the Soviet
workers.189 In light of his domestic distresses, the current legalization of
the Ukrainian Uniate Church appears almost suicidal. An inevitable
process of democratization and liberalization of religious life will undoub-
tedly contribute to the new tide of social ferment. What Gorbachev still
does not seem to comprehend is that those who are feared a great deal
are sometimes admired, but those who are feared a little bit are usually
hated. He does understand, however, that glasnost has its limits; to
survive he has to retain the control of his crumbling empire and most
likely to crack down on the rebelling national minorities, workers, and
again on the Party's conservatives. In a tradeoff presented silently to the
West, the East European freedom is offered as a price paid up-front for
the tolerance to an inevitable upcoming domestic confrontation in the
Soviet Union. These possible implications of perestroika must be well
analyzed in the West. In 1988, Sakharov claimed that so far the Soviet
people face "perestroika only from above." 190 After one year of
experimenting with constitutional restructuring it is quite clear that
perestroika is now hardly controllable from above. The question remains,
however, whether it is still reversible.
186. Remnick, Presidential Bill Passes in Moscow: Gorbachev Prevails After Angry Debate
Over 'Dictatorship,' Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Clines, Gorbachev Forces Bill
On Presdency Past Legislature, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
187. See generally Will the Crisis of Communism Begin in Poland?, Hoover Inst., Stanford
Univ. (1983).
188. Id.
189. Shlapentokh, Gorbachev's Real Foe - The Soviet Workers, Wash. Post, Nov. 26,
1989, at C2, col. 1.
190. Lee, Sakharov Sees Threat to Reform, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1;
Kirkpatrick, Sakharov's Fears, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1988, at A23, col. 4.
[Vol. 10
